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ABSTRACT 
The present study investigates the cognitive mechanism underlying the control of interference 
during dual-task coordination. Partially inspired by the Conflict Monitoring Hypothesis 
(Botvinick et al., 2001), we test the assumption that dual-task interference is resolved by a 
top-down adaptation mechanism that is responsible for behavioral adjustments in the 
prioritization of the coordinated tasks. In a series of two experiments, we measured conflict 
adaptation to the so-called Gratton effect—the decrease in dual-task interference following 
incompatible trials. In Experiment 1 the primary task was a low demand choice discrimination 
task, while in Experiment 2 the primary task was an updating task that imposes a continuous 
load on working memory. The secondary task was a tone discrimination task. Both 
experiments consistently showed that the response conflict of previous trial triggers top-down 
behavioral adjustments that reduce interference. We conclude that dual-task interference 
shows strong similarities to Stroop-like types of cognitive interference, namely in the way that 
suboptimal performance is dealt with by the cognitive system.
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Executive functions can be generally described as a set of abilities required to intentionally 
guide behavior towards a goal, especially in novel or non-routine situations (Banich, 2009). 
Various tasks are believed to rely on executive functions. These include prioritizing and 
sequencing behavior, inhibiting familiar or automatic behaviors, creating and maintaining an 
idea of what task or information is most relevant for current purposes, providing resistance to 
information that is distracting or irrelevant to the current goal, switching between tasks, 
utilizing relevant information in support of decision making, categorizing elements, and 
managing novel information or situations. Executive control processes like inhibition, task-
switching, updating, and dual-task coordination have been extensively investigated during the 
past decades (e.g. Miyake, Friedman, Emerson, Witzki, Howerter, & Wager, 2000; Chan, 
Shum, Toulopoulou & Chen, 2008). One of the least well understood of these functions is 
dual-task coordination, in which participants are required to perform two tasks 
simultaneously. The literature on multitasking suggests that people generally cannot make 
decisions or select responses in two different tasks at the same time (see Pashler, 1994). 
Performing two concurrent tasks usually affects performance on both tasks (i.e. dual-task cost 
or dual-task interference). In order to optimize dual-task performance, an executive control 
mechanism is supposed to efficiently divide cognitive resources between the different tasks 
(McCann & Johnston, 1992). Bottleneck theories propose that some processing needed to 
perform each task requires access to a processor that can only act on one input at a time 
(Pashler, 1994). If both tasks require the processor simultaneously, then only one can get 
access to it. While this processor is busy with one task, processing for the other task must be 
suspended until the processor is free. An alternative to this explanation is the central capacity 
sharing model (Tombu & Jolicœur, 2003), which suggest that tasks must share the available 
processing capacity because resources are limited. Thus there is an increase in the duration of 
processing during the period in which capacity is shared. However, the nature of the executive 
control mechanism underlying dual-task coordination remains unclear to this day. 
The current study investigates dual-task coordination within the framework of the 
Conflict Monitoring Hypothesis (Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter, & Cohen, 2001). Conflict 
monitoring is regarded as a cognitive control function that monitors the occurrence of conflict 
or interference in information processing. In their seminal work, Botvinick and colleagues 
proposed that conflict monitoring processes serve to adjust the level of control.  According to 
this account, the occurrence of conflict triggers top-down behavioral adaptations by which 
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conflict is reduced or resolved. The conflict monitoring hypothesis is based on a set of 
behavioral observations that appear to reflect on-line reactive adjustments in control. An 
example of this conflict adaptation mechanism is provided by Gratton, Coles, and Donchin 
(1992). Their study provides evidence for a sequential adaptation effect in the Eriksen flanker 
task (Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974). The flanker task requires a left or right response depending on 
the identity of a centrally presented target symbol. This target is surrounded by distracting 
flanker symbols that are either compatible (e.g. < < < < <) or incompatible (e.g. < < > < <) 
with the required response. Incompatible flanker trials are usually processed slower than 
compatible ones. Gratton et al. (1992) investigated the effects of trial-type transitions 
(compatible – compatible [C-C], compatible – incompatible [C-I], incompatible –compatible 
[I-C], and incompatible – incompatible [I-I]) and found that the conflict effect (reaction times 
for incompatible minus compatible trials) was reduced after incompatible trials. The 
occurrence of an incompatible trial thus appears to enhance target processing and/or suppress 
flanker processing on the following trial.  
The observed effect is explained as follows: after an incompatible trial, high top-down 
control is exerted to attend the relevant task dimension (e.g. naming the ink color in the 
Stroop task or focusing on the central arrow in the flanker task) and produce the correct 
response. Then, when another incompatible trial is presented under conditions of high control, 
the subsequent conflict effect is smaller. We can label this as a situation of high control and 
low conflict. By contrast, after a compatible trial, there is no need for top-down regulation and 
few control resources are deployed; conflict is higher when an incompatible trial is presented, 
as evidenced by a stronger conflict effect. This situation can be labeled low control and high 
conflict. The modulation of conflict effects as a function of control level is believed to reflect 
the workings of the control mechanism described in the Conflict Monitoring Theory 
(Botvinick et al., 1999). As argued by Botvinick and colleagues (1999, 2001), these findings 
appear to provide an example of the reactive adjustments in control posited by the conflict 
monitoring hypothesis: incompatible trials involve response conflict, and it is this, according 
to the theory, that causes them to be associated with a subsequent intensification of top-down 
control.  
It has been demonstrated that in addition to the flanker task, this control mechanism 
underlies performance in many of the popular interference and inhibition tasks like the Simon 
task (Sturmer, Leuthold, Soetens, Schroeter & Sommer, 2002; Wuhr & Ansorge, 2005), 
Stroop task (Barch, Braver, Akbudak, Conturo & Snyder, 2001; Egner & Hirsch, 2005a, 
2005b; Kerns, Cohen, MacDonald, Cho, Stenger & Carter, 2004), and Go/No-go task 
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(Menon, Adleman, White, Glover & Reiss, 2001; Nieuwenhuis, Yeung, Van den Wildenberg, 
& Ridderinkhof, 2003). A more recent study (Szmalec, Verbruggen, Vandierendonck & 
Kemps, 2011) found evidence for Gratton-like adaptation effects in a 2-back updating task 
involving lure trials, i.e. trials that elicit proactive interference. For example, the trial B-F-K-
B requires a negative 2-back response, but the negative response is typically slowed by the 
erroneous tendency to respond positively following activation of the letter B in the non-target 
3-back position. Szmalec et al. (2011) observed that lure interference was reduced when 
following another lure trial compared to when following a neutral mismatch trial (e.g. M-F-K-
B), and they concluded that the interference control mechanism represented by the Conflict 
Monitoring Hypothesis is also involved in the executive control function of memory updating.  
At the neurological level, conflict monitoring (CM) is believed to be a function of the 
anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) (Botvinick, Nystrom, Fissell, Carter & Cohen, 1999; 
Botvinick, Cohen & Carter, 2004), which is located on the medial surface of the frontal lobes. 
Top-down adaptations following the detection of conflict by the ACC is understood as a 
selective activation of relevant task demands stored in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex 
(DLPFC) in order to resolve the interference or conflict and optimize goal-directed behavior 
(see Davis, Hutchison, Lozano, Tasker & Dostrovsky, 2000). The DLPFC is a part of the 
frontal lobes that is believed to be a regulative, adaptive device that resolves conflicts by 
activating task-appropriate behavior based on the task-demands that are being represented 
(Miller & Cohen, 2001; Alvares & Emory, 2006). This interaction between an evaluative 
function (i.e. conflict monitoring) at the level of the ACC and a regulative function (i.e. 
conflict adaptation and administration of cognitive resources) at the level of the DLPFC offers 
a cognitive control mechanism that has been recognized as very effective and influential in 
the conflict literature (see Carter & van Veen, 2007 for a review). 
The goal of the present study is to test the hypothesis that the conflict 
monitoring/control mechanism is also involved in dual-task coordination. Our hypothesis is 
based on the following two considerations: Firstly, dual-tasking has been put forward as an 
executive control function (e.g. Baddeley, 1996), and it can be argued that resolving the 
interference occurring in both conflict tasks (such as the Stroop task or the flanker 
compatibility effect) and dual-tasks demands higher executive control engagement than non-
conflict tasks. In the case of conventional interference tasks, conflict is understood as a 
competition between an automatic and a controlled process, like word reading and color 
naming in the Stroop task necessitating executive control processes to overrule the incorrect 
automatic activation. In dual-task coordination, however, when the processing of two stimuli 
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that belong to two different tasks is performed, a competition arises between the processing of 
Task A and Task B, causing so-called cross-task interference (Pashler, 1994; Monsell, 2003). 
Here the response selection processes require control processes to proceed with bottleneck 
overlap, and processes only one task at a time (Lien, Ruthruff & Johnson, 2006) or shares the 
available processing capacity (Tombu & Jolicœur, 2003). Secondly, it has also been 
demonstrated that both the DLPFC and ACC are activated during dual-task performance 
(Sala, Baddeley, Papagno & Spinnler, 1995; Szameitat, Schubert, Muller & von Cramon, 
2002; Botvinick et al., 2001). Given the role of the ACC in conflict monitoring, the latter 
finding is in line with the hypothesis that the ACC-DLPFC control mechanism is engaged in 
dual-task performance. The experiments presented below are aimed to investigate whether the 
executive control mechanism involved in traditional conflict tasks also underlies dual-task 
performance. In order to investigate whether this control mechanism is also involved in dual-
tasking and assess the functioning of the cognitive control mechanism in behavioral measures, 
we measured Gratton-like top-down adaptation effects (Gratton et al., 1992). Therefore, it was 
investigated whether dual-task performance also yields top-down conflict adaptation 
behavior. More precisely, it was assumed that the conflict effects (i.e. dual-task interference 
effect) would be reduced if followed by a conflict trial (dual-task) relative to being followed 
by another non-conflict trial (single-task). To do so, we asked participants to name the color 
of  letter strings as a main/primary task and presented them simultaneously with tone 
discrimination in half of the trials as a secondary/dual task. 
 
Experiment 1 
 
Method 
Subjects  
Twenty undergraduate students (10 female and 10 male) from the University of Social 
Sciences & Humanities participated in the experiment. All participants received credit points 
for their participation.  
 
Apparatus and stimuli presentation settings 
Participants were tested on a Pentium computer running Super-Lab 4.5 software and 
sat in front of a computer screen at a viewing distance of approximately 60 cm. All stimuli 
were presented centrally on a 15-inch color monitor, and the size of the letter strings was 72 
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points. The tones lasted for 250ms and were presented via earphones at two different 
frequencies: 300 Hz and 1100 Hz. The responses were made by pressing the “z”, “c”, “,”, or 
“/” keys on the keyboard; these keys were labeled with the numbers “1”, “2”, “3” and “4” for 
the experimental procedure. All other keys were discarded during the experiment.  
 
Procedure  
All participants performed the dual task, where the primary task was to name the color 
(red or green) of a letter string (for all trials it was “XXXXX”). On dual-task trials a tone was 
presented along with letters and participant had to discriminate whether the tone was high or 
low.  
Instructions and sample presentations were given on a computer screen at the 
beginning of the experiment and the need to respond as fast as possible while trying to avoid 
an error was stressed. Participants were asked to maintain fixation on the centre of the screen 
before each target was presented. Each subject was presented with 16 practice trials followed 
with 192 experimental trials, which were divided into 3 blocks (64 trials in each block) 
separated by short, 30 second breaks for participants to rest. The participants were instructed 
to press the key “1” or “2” in order to indicate the color of letter string and “3” or “4” to 
respond to the tones. The opposite mapping was used for the other participants. Indications 
for possible answers were presented at the bottom of the screen after each trial. There were no 
suggestions regarding task priority, so participants could decide which stimulus to respond to 
first.  
The sequence of events on each trial was as follows: a fixation point was displayed for 
500ms, after which a letter string appeared for 250ms and was simultaneously accompanied 
by a tone in the case of dual task trials. Half of the trials were single-task (only letters) and the 
other half were dual-task (letters and tone), presented in random order within blocks. 
Participants were given 3000ms to respond, after which the next trial was began. A lack of 
response within this time was recorded as “no-response”. There was a 2000ms blank screen 
gap between trial presentation. Responses were provided with feedback: small crosses 
appeared on the screen to assure participants that their reaction was recorded. Both correct 
and error responses were recorded. 
 
Results 
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Analyses were conducted on reaction times (mean raw RTs in milliseconds for correct 
responses to the primary task – i.e. color naming, responded to first) in order to compare 
reactions to the same task under different load conditions, and error rates (the proportion of 
incorrect responses in all trials; for dual task, responses from both the primary and secondary 
task were included to score accuracy). The data were then analyzed with 2x2 repeated 
measure ANOVA, with type of current trial (S - single vs. D - dual) and type of the previous 
trial (s - single vs. d - dual) as independent variables.  
Analysis of RTs revealed one significant main effect, showing that responses for the 
primary task in dual-task trials were slower than for single trials (MD = 731 ms, SD = 166 vs. 
MS = 666 ms, SD = 147): F(1,19) = 29.49, p < .001, η2 = .61. As can be seen on Figure 1 this 
difference was present for both types of previous trial conditions. RTs for dual trials were 
longer compared to single trials if the previous trial was single (MsD = 730 ms, SD = 175 vs. 
MsS = 601 ms, SD = 118), F(1,19) = 28, p < .001, η2 = .60 , as well is if the previous trial was 
dual (MdD = 774 ms, SD = 177 vs. MdS = 687 ms, SD = 154), F(1,19) = 24.9, p < .001, η2 = 
.57. The effects were qualified by the nature of the relation between the current and previous 
trials, and thus the interaction between the type of trial and the type of previous trial was 
significant: F(1,19) = 8.36, p < .01, η2 = .31. In both cases primary tasks performed after dual-
task trials were slower. However, reaction time incenses were larger for single (from MsS = 
601 ms, SD = 118 to MdS = 687 ms, SD = 154)  task than for dual task (from MsD = 730 ms, 
SD = 175 to MdD = 774 ms, SD = 177) trials: F(1,19) = 37.07,  p < .001, η2 =  .66 and F(1,19) 
= 11.8, p < .01, η2 = .38, respectively.  
 
---------------------------------------- 
Figure 1 here 
---------------------------------------- 
 
The error data (see figure 2) showed that in general trials performed after dual-task 
trials were more accurate than trials performed after single-task trials (Md = .12, SD = .12 vs. 
Ms = .14, SD = .14), observable as the significant main effect of type of previous trial: F(1,19) 
= 7.45, p < .05, η2 = .28. Further analysis revealed that this is mainly due to the better 
accuracy of dual trials performed after other dual trials relative to those performed after single 
trials (MdD = .11, SD = .13 vs. MsD = .32, SD = .15: F(1,19) = 8.45, p < .05, η2 = .31). There 
were no significant differences in accuracy for single-task trials as there was no significant 
interaction. 
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---------------------------------------- 
Figure 2 here 
---------------------------------------- 
 
 
Additionally, we looked at the task prioritization for dual-task trials and found that in 
87.6% (SD=19.3%) of all dual trials color naming task was performed as a primary task and 
tone discrimination as the secondary. To see how this strategy influenced task performance, 
we compared the refractory periods for primary and secondary tasks (Lien, Ruthruff & 
Johnston, 2006). Using 2x2 repeated measure ANOVA, we compared the proportions of time 
needed to respond firstly to the primary (color naming) and then secondary (tone 
discrimination) task within dual-trials (type of trial: primary vs. secondary), performed either 
after single or dual trials (type of previous trial: single vs. dual) – see figure 3. The analysis 
revealed that in general secondary tasks were performed faster than primary tasks (MSec = 453 
ms, SD = 210 vs. MPrim = 766 ms, SD = 176; F(1,19) = 29.97, p < .001, η2 = .61), with a 
significant interaction between task type and previous trial type: F(1,19) = 29.97, p < .001, η2 
= .61. This was due to faster responses to the primary task when performed after a single trial 
(MPrim-single = 730 ms, SD = 175) than after another dual trial (MPrim-dual = 774 ms, SD = 177): 
F(1,19) = 11.8, p < .01, η2 = .38. The cognitive slack for the secondary task was reduced 
when performed after a dual trial (MSec-dual = 400 ms, SD = 179) compared to those performed 
after single trials (MSec-single = 503 ms, SD = 241): F(1,19) = 10, p < .01, η2 = .35. Importantly, 
there was a trend level difference –showing that the overall time needed to respond to a dual 
task trial after a single task trial was slightly longer than after another dual trial: F(1,19) = 
3.41, p = .08 (Msingle = 1233 ms, SD = 308 vs Mdual = 1174 ms, SD = 271). 
---------------------------------------- 
Figure 3 here 
---------------------------------------- 
 
 
Discussion 
	  
The present experiment tested whether conflict monitoring mechanisms can account for 
control of interference during dual-tasking. We investigated whether dual-task performance 
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also yields Gratton-like conflict adaptation effects (Gratton et al., 1992). The results 
confirmed our prediction: performance in both single and dual task conditions was modulated 
by the nature of the previous trial. The cost of adapting to a high control demanding task (i.e. 
dual task) performed after a low control demanding (i.e. single task) was smaller than after 
another demanding task. This can also be concluded when comparing dual task performance. 
The refractory period needed to process the secondary task was reduced if the dual task was 
performed after another dual trial. The error data also supports the conflict adaptation 
hypothesis. As can be seen on the graph (see figure 2), increased control after a conflict trial 
resulted in higher accuracy. This stands in line with previous observations that accuracy 
functions for compatible and incompatible trials is sorted on the basis of the compatibility 
level of the previous trial (Gratton et al., 1992).  
On a theoretical level, our results can be explain in terms of the central capacity 
sharing model (Tombu & Jolicoeur, 2003). As predicted there, the stage of response selection, 
in cases with very short or no stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) between task A and task B, 
causes central processing overlap, which demands the sharing of available resources for both 
tasks. This cause slow-down in processing of task A compared to the cases where there is 
only a single task to perform, or SOA between task A and task B is long enough that A 
finishes central processing before B. This effect, should not appear according to central 
bottleneck model (Pashler, 1994). Here, at short SOAs task B is waiting for task A to finish 
bottleneck processing, however the RTs for task A should not be affected despite of task B 
appearance. In our experiment a general slow-down appeared when comparing the reaction 
times for the primary task performed within a single task trial vs. dual-task trials (see figure 
1), which means that color naming task partially shared central resources with tone 
discrimination task. Additionally, we can observe that the process is qualified by the level of 
control, which reduces the adaptation costs (i.e. response selection) to dual-task if performed 
after another high-control demanding task. Looking at the differences in time needed to 
perform secondary-tasks we can draw the conclusion that higher control activation improves 
the response selection process and by this reduce time of secondary task performance (see 
figure 3). Overall, these findings confirm the literature on conflict adaptation and hence 
support our hypothesis that dual-task interference is resolved by the same conflict 
monitoring/control mechanism as the other often postulated executive control functions. 
 
 
11	  
	  
Experiment 2 
 
Experiment 1 showed increased top-down behavioral adjustment after resolving a dual-task. It 
should be noted that both the primary and secondary tasks used in Experiment 1 are discrete 
tasks in the sense that information processing only occurs between the stimulus and response. 
As shown by our additional analysis, participants mainly responded to both tasks in a 
sequential fashion – first to the color of the letter string first and then to the tone. This 
required minimal dual-task demands. The goal of Experiment 2 was to extend the results from 
Experiment 1 by using a primary task that imposes a continuous cognitive load, through 
which concurrent processing demands are maximized. To this end, we used an n-back 
updating task (e.g. Owen et al., 2005). The n-back task requires participants to decide whether 
each stimulus in a sequence matches the one that appeared n items ago (e.g. Owen, McMillan, 
Laird & Bullmore, 2005). An example of a 1-back match for the letter string F-B-B-L is when 
B appears two times in a row, and an example of a 2-back match is F-B-L-B.  A 2-back 
mismatch would be F-B-L-F. Subjects are required to remember a specified number (n) of the 
most recently presented items in serial order (n-back). While the task evolves and new items 
are presented, the subjects have to update the memorized string of n most recent items: they 
need to unbind the oldest item and bind the most recent one to a position in working memory. 
To correctly perform the n-back task participants have to hold and manipulate information 
between trials, hence strongly relying on executive control functions located in the prefrontal 
cortex (PC) (Kane, Conway, Miura & Colflesh, 2007; Owen et al., 2005; Rodriguez-Jimanez, 
Avila, Garcia-Navarro, Bagney, Aragon, Ventura-Campos, Martinez-Gras, Forn, Ponce, 
Rubio, Jimenez-Arriero & Palomo, 2009). In this experiment the dual-task procedure required 
participants to respond to different stimuli (auditory and visual, as in Experiment 1) but also 
to maintain and update information from trial to trial. So the primary task was a 1-back task. 
In some of the trials (50% of total trials) a tone appeared and participants also had to respond 
if this tone had a high or low pitch. As in the previous experiment, we predicted that the 
conflict effects (i.e. dual-task interference effect) would be reduced if followed by a conflict 
trial (dual-task) relative to being followed by another non-conflict trial (single-task).  
 
Method 
Subjects 
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Twenty two undergraduate students (12 female and 10 male) from the University of 
Social Sciences & Humanities participated in the experiment. They received credit points for 
their participation. The data of two participants were excluded (1M and 1F), as more than 
30% of their reactions were recorded as “no-response”.  
 
Apparatus and stimuli presentation settings 
 We used the same apparatus and stimuli settings as in experiment 1. 
 
Materials and procedure 
The primary task was a 1-back memory updating task, with 18 randomly chosen letters 
from the Latin alphabet. Additionally, a high or low tone was presented along with the letter 
in the dual task situation. Instructions with sample presentations were given on a computer 
screen at the beginning of the experiment. Each subject was presented with 2 blocks of trials 
(144 trials in total), separated with short, 30 second rest periods. The list of trials in each 
block contained 36 match trials (i.e. letter matched the letter presented 1 position before) and 
36 mismatch trials (i.e. letter did not match the letter presented 1 position before). 50% of 
trials were dual task trials with the additional requirement of tone discrimination. Before 
starting the main experimental blocks participant performed 16 warm-up 1-back trials, with 
feedback provided if their answers were correct or incorrect. 
The sequence of events on each trial was as follows: A letter was displayed for 500ms, 
with tone presented simultaneously for dual task trials. After the letter disappeared, 
participants were given 3000ms to respond, after which the next trial began. A lack of 
response within this time was recorded as “no-response”. Responses were provided with 
feedback - small crosses appeared on the screen to assure participants that their reaction was 
recorded. Both correct and error responses were recorded. Response times were recorded 
relative to the onset of the stimulus. 
 
 
Results 
As previously, analyses were conducted on mean reaction times for correct responses on the 
primary task (i.e. 1-back task) and error rates. The data were analyzed with 2x2 repeated 
measure ANOVA, with type of trial (S vs. D) and type of the previous trial (s vs. d) as 
independent variables.  
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The analyses revealed similar effects as in experiment 1. As illustrated on figure 4 the 
main effect of type of trial was significant, showing that in general responses to the primary 
task in dual-task trials were slower (MD = 1092 ms, SD = 269) than in single trials (MS = 1023 
ms, SD = 298): F(1,19) = 15.38, p < .01, η2 = .45. As previously, these differences occurred 
for both types of  previous trial conditions: if the previous trial was single (MsD = 1038 ms, 
SD = 224 vs. MsS = 956 ms, SD = 261), F(1,19) = 13.71, p < .01, η2 = .42, as well as if the 
previous trial was dual (MdD = 1145 ms, SD = 314 vs. MdS = 1089 ms, SD = 336), F(1,19) = 
14.34, p < .01, η2 = .43. Additionally, the main effect of previous trial type occurred, as 
primary-task responses appearing after single trials were performed faster than those after 
dual trials (Ms = 967 ms, SD = 242 vs. Md = 1117 ms, SD = 325): F(1,19) = 17.69; p < .001, 
η2 = .48. Again, these effects were qualified by the nature of the relation between the current 
and previous trials and resulted in a trend level interaction: F(1,19) = 3.89, p = .06, η2 = .17. 
Thus single trials produced longer response times if they appeared after a dual trial (MdS = 
1089 ms, SD = 336) than after a single trial (MsS = 956 ms, SD = 261): F(1,19) = 19.91,  p < 
.001, η2 = .51. There was also a significant difference for dual task trials, though smaller in 
size (MsD = 1038 ms, SD = 224 vs. MdD = 1145 ms, SD = 314): F(1,19) = 13.78, p < 0.01,  η2 
= .42. 
 
---------------------------------------- 
Figure 4 here 
---------------------------------------- 
 
Analysis of errors (figure 5) showed a significant main effect of type of previous trial: 
F(1,19) = 26.32, p < .001, η2 = .58. Trials performed after dual-task trials were more accurate 
than trials performed after single-task (Md = .14, SD = .14 vs. Ms = .24, SD = .12). There was 
also a main effect for type of current trial, F(1,19) = 10.39, p < .01, η2 = .35, indicating that 
single trials were more accurate than dual trials (MD = .13, SD = .12 vs. MS = .16, SD = .14). 
Lastly, there was a significant interaction: F(1,19) = 36.45, p < .001, η2 = .66. This was 
caused by the relatively low accuracy of dual trials performed right after single trials (MsD = 
.31, SD = .09) as compared to dual trials performed after another dual trial (MdD = .14, SD = 
.13), F(1,19) = 65.52, p < .001, η2 = .78, and compared to single trials performed after another 
singe trial (MsS = .17, SD = .14), F(1,19) = 41.79, p < .001, η2 = .69.  
 
---------------------------------------- 
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Figure 5 here 
---------------------------------------- 
 
As in Experiment 1, we checked for task prioritization in dual-task trials and found 
that in 88.4% (SD=18.9%) of all dual trials the n-back task was performed as the primary task 
and tone discrimination as the secondary. A 2x2 repeated measure ANOVA (type of task: 
primary vs. secondary x type of previous trial: single vs. dual) revealed a significant main 
effect of task type: F(1,19) = 13.12, p < .001, η2 = .41 – see figure 6. Time needed to respond 
to the primary n-back task was greater than to the secondary tone discrimination task (MPrim = 
1085 ms, SD = 269 vs. MSec = 787 ms, SD = 337).  We also found a significant interaction of 
factors: F(1,19) = 6.94, p < .05, η2 = .27. As in experiment 1, time needed to respond to the 
primary task when it was performed after a single trial (MPrim-sing = 1038 ms, SD = 224) was 
shorter than after another dual trial (MPrim-dual = 1145 ms, SD = 314), F(1,19) = 13.78, p < .01, 
η2 = .42, while the response lag for the secondary task was at a trend level of significance 
(MSec-dual = 730 ms, SD = 175 vs. MSec-sing = 774 ms, SD = 177), F(1,19) = 3.09, p = .08, η2 = 
.14).  
 
---------------------------------------- 
Figure 6 here 
---------------------------------------- 
 
 
Discussion 
 
The goal of Experiment 2 was to investigate whether the conflict monitoring/control 
mechanism can be deployed to adapt to interference in dual-tasking when the primary task 
also imposes a continuous load on working memory. The results support our main hypothesis, 
in the sense that a Gratton-like conflict adaptation effect (Gratton et al., 1992) was observed. 
The conflict effect was larger under conditions of low top-down control, i.e. when the 
previous trial was non-conflict (single), than under conditions of higher top-down control, i.e. 
when the previous trial was conflict. We again observed improvement of the response 
selection process, which resulted in overall better coping with task overlap. However, it is 
worth noting the differences between the results obtained in experiments 1 and 2. While the 
response times and error patterns for the dual-task was similar in both experiments, the exact 
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response times for the secondary task were longer in experiment 2 even though the task was 
the same, e.g. tone discrimination. Time measured for the primary task response was 451 ms 
(SD = 199) in Experiment 1 and 791 ms (SD = 307) in Experiment 2 (t(38) = 4.16, p < .001). 
This may be due to the higher control and resource demands of the 1-back working memory 
updating task relative to the less demanding color-naming task used in Experiment 1. This 
again stands in line with predictions from the Central Capacity Sharing Model (Tombu & 
Jolicœur, 2003), as more demanding tasks increase the time that tasks are shared in central 
processing. Taking this together with the accuracy data, we can see that the state of lower top-
down control appears in this case only after repeated single-trials, resulting in relatively fast 
responses but a higher error rate. This again suggests that the state of higher control, which is 
obtained after performing dual-task, improves the process of response selection on the next 
trial, as response representation are activate and available for central resources. Altogether, 
these findings show that increased control reduced the conflict through top-down adaptation, 
but the exact behaviors that lead to this conflict reduction depend on the nature of the primary 
and secondary tasks.  
 
Conclusion 
 
The main goal of the current study was to investigate whether conflict adaptation 
mechanisms, as described by the Conflict Monitoring Hypothesis, also underlie dual-tasking. 
We based our expectations on the assumption that there are similarities between the 
interference occurring in traditional conflict tasks (e.g. Stroop task or flanker task) and dual-
task interference. Across two experiments we provided evidence that decreased cognitive 
control after a single task resulted in high conflict effects when a secondary task appeared. 
This can be understood as a state of low top-down regulation in which the monitor and 
regulative system are not triggered to resolve the interference because the interference is 
scarce. By contrast, an increased top-down regulation after dual-task trials reduces the conflict 
in information processing while also slowing down performance overall. 
Despite the observed similarities, a few differences must be underlined here. In the 
case of conventional conflict or interference tasks, interference is understood as a competition 
between an automatic and a controlled process (like word reading and color naming in the 
Stroop task). In dual-task coordination, when the processing of two stimuli that belong to two 
different tasks is required, competition arises between the processing of Task A and Task B, 
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causing so-called dual-task interference (see. Pashler, 1994; Monsell, 2003). It is worth 
mentioning that there are also differences between the resolution of dual-task interference and 
Stroop-like interference. In traditional conflict tasks, top-down adaptation means attending to 
and prioritizing processing of the relevant dimension of the task, while ignoring the irrelevant 
dimension. In a dual-task setting, however, both response “dimensions”  are relevant, which 
means that top-down behavioral adjustments are more strategic in the sense that they deal 
with the bottleneck limitations and tasks competition for central resources (McCann & 
Johnston, 1992; Lien, Ruthruff & Johnston, 2006). What is usually observed is that the central 
resources are at least partially shared at the stage of response selection and thus a cognitive 
slack appears before the secondary task response selection can be completed. However, our 
experiments showed that increased cognitive control reduces the slack period and improves 
performance accuracy, while also slowing down the overall performance of both the primary 
and secondary task. Results confirm reduced conflict adaptation (Gratton-like effect) to 
secondary task if followed after another conflict task.  
The bottleneck models postulates that bottleneck stages are responsible for response 
selection and decision making, while early processing is responsible for stimulus 
identification and late processing is responsible for response execution. The early and late 
stages can act on several stimuli simultaneously and can proceed simultaneously with 
bottleneck processing. In other words, stimulus identification and response execution can 
operate in parallel, whereas processors at or around response selection must operate on stimuli 
serially (Pashler, 1994) or share available resources (Tombu & Jolicœur, 2003). The results of 
our experiments suggests that higher top-down control organizes the “preapproval” of 
required responses and thus secondary task “bypassing” is less likely to appear (Maquestiaux, 
Lague-Beauvais, Ruthruff & Bherer, 2008; Tombu & Jolicœur, 2003). Comparing the 
differences in RT needed to respond to primary task (see figures 1 & 4) we can see that the 
task response is delayed by secondary task appearance – which suggest that central resources 
are partially shared by both tasks, as predicted by central capacity sharing model (see Tombu 
& Jolicœur, 2003). Moreover, taking into account RT’s for secondary task (see figures 3 & 6) 
as well as the error rate data (see figures 2 & 5) we can conclude that the conflict adaptation is 
improving response selection process probably due to remaining activation of response 
representations for secondary task. In order to this the task become “less demanding” and the 
time both task share available central resources is reduced.  
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However, as to better understand which of the processes involved in dual task 
performance are optimized (e.g. attention allocation, response selection, or response strategy), 
future studies should include e.g. the manipulation of resource demands of the secondary task 
as well as the SOA interval. But as far as the current data are concerned, it seems that both 
types of adaptation (e.g. conflict and dual-task) are achieved through an executive control 
mechanism.  
This behavioral study provides evidence for Gratton-like conflict or interference 
adaptation effects in the context of dual-task performance. It suggests that demonstration of 
the Gratton effect is not restricted to tasks where controlled processing is required to respond 
only to the relevant features of stimuli while ignoring those that are irrelevant. Taking this 
along with previous studies on working memory updating (Szmalec, Verbruggen, 
Vandierendonck & Kemps, 2011), we argue that the control mechanism behind the Gratton 
effect seems to be a functionally adaptive mechanism of cognitive control that can 
administrate the way people perform multiple types of everyday tasks. 
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